INTRODUCTION
On 25 April 2015, a magnitude-7.8 earthquake struck Nepal and on 12 May 2015, a magnitude-7.3 earthquake aftershock hit Nepal again. The earthquakes caused 8,604 deaths and 16,808 injured people (based on the information on 18 May 2015). 1) Immediately after the occurrence of the disaster, the authors were dispatched to Nepal for about two weeks as part of the disaster assistance provided by the United Nations. This paper is based on the field experience of the authors.
Since the disaster type was earthquake, it attracted many international search and rescue teams. International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) is a network of international search and rescue teams, and the secretariat of INSARAG sits at the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Before the Nepal earthquake, INSARAG has just endorsed the new INSARAG Guidelines 1 at the INSARAG Steering Group (ISG) meeting in February 2015. The new Guidelines included new assessment methods and marking system based on the lessons learned from the Haiti earthquake of 2010. The Nepal earthquake was the first large-scale earthquake to have occurred after the endorsement of the revised guidelines. One of the authors, Mr. Okita, was involved in the revision of the guidelines and the methodologies as the staff of the INSARAG Secretariat, while Mr. Katsube was a member of the INSARAG Operations Working Group (OWG), which was established after the Haiti earthquake of 2010, and in that capacity, Mr. Katsube also contributed to the development of the INSARAG methodologies. In the Nepal earthquake, both of them contributed to the coordination activities of the international search and rescue teams. This paper will look at the coordination of the international search and rescue teams, especially the "urban" search and rescue (USAR) teams, in the Nepal earthquake. At the same time, based on the authors' experiences in Nepal, this paper will consider the so-called "Disaster Literacy": the basic knowledge that USAR experts should have when responding to disasters.
DEPLOYMENT TO NEPAL AND INITIAL SET UPS

Entering Nepal
To begin, we will briefly touch on how we entered Nepal and the types of activities in which we were involved. On 25 April 2015 when the earthquake occurred, Mr. Okita was in Bangkok, Thailand in order to conduct a capacity assessment for the Thai USAR team, which was planned from 27 April to 1 May 2015. A few hours after the earthquake on 25 April, he received a phone call from the OCHA Field Coordination Support Section (FCSS; in Geneva, Switzerland) and was deployed to Nepal together with the staff of OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP; in Bangkok, Thailand) as the OCHA advance team. 2 As it was expected that Mr. Okita would be in charge of the management of the "Reception/Departure Centre (RDC)" at the airport, he procured some equipment such as flashlight, knife, food, and stationery, which was necessary for the RDC. On 26 April, around 10 am, he arrived in the Kathmandu Airport with four members of the OCHA-ROAP on a Thai Airways flight. 3 Mr. Katsube has been registered as a member of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) since 2010, which the OCHA-FCSS serves as the secretariat (as in the case of INSARAG), and thus he was selected as a member of the UNDAC team deployed to Nepal. Since the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) rescue team of Japan was also dispatched to the country, he tried to enter Kathmandu on the same flight of the JDR team. The flight, which was supposed to arrive at the Kathmandu Airport on 27 May was directed to Calcutta, India and then, had to return to Bangkok again. It was in the evening on 28 May when he finally arrived in Kathmandu. He was instructed by the UNDAC team leader to support the RDC as UNDAC member, and thus stayed in the Kathmandu Airport.
RDC (Reception/Departure Centre)
Of the five people who arrived at the Kathmandu Airport on 26 May as part of the OCHA advance team, only Mr. Okita remained at the airport to run the RDC, which worked as the reception point for the international teams (Photo 1). The other four members went to Kathmandu city for discussion with the United Nations office and Nepal's National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA).
The main role of RDCs is to register all incoming international teams and to provide an initial briefing for them at the arrival airport. Mr. Okita needed to get permission from the Kathmandu Airport authorities and the airport police on matters such as the acquisition of the access card to enter the restricted area, and this process took about 5 or 6 hours. It was around 10 pm on 26 May, 12 hours after arrival in Nepal, that Mr. Okita completed the setting up of the RDC at the exit of the arrival gate.
Since the earthquake, the Kathmandu Airport had conducted 24-hour operation, and so, while taking an occasional nap at RDC, Mr. Okita also operated the RDC 24 hours a day.
There were a number of reasons why he set up the RDC at this location. Firstly, the outside of the airport was full of people waiting for their departures (Photo 2), and there was a risk of theft of the equipment. Thus, it was determined to locate the RDC inside the airport. Secondly, all the arrival passengers must go through this point, and thus it was the best point to register the international teams. In addition, when the INSARAG exercise was held in Kathmandu in 2009, Mr. Okita had participated in the exercise as part of the JDR Secretariat of Japan at that time. The location of the RDC was exactly the same place as where the UNDAC team in the exercise has established the RDC.
Photo 1 RDC just after the set-up Photo 2 Outside of the airport (Both photos were taken by the author on 26 May 2015.)
Mr. Okita and Mr. Katsube, as UNDAC members, have played a central role in the management of the RDC, with the support and assistance of international teams such as Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), Singapore, Malaysia, China, and Germany, who provided support staff for the RDC. This is based on the INSARAG Guidelines, which requests that international search and rescue teams provide support staff for RDC and "On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC)", which UNDAC teams set up at the centre of the affected area and do the coordination for international assistance.
Until the closing-down of the RDC on 7 May, the RDC registered 73 search and rescue teams, 147 medical teams, and 166 other teams (e.g. food, shelter), a total of 386 teams. The RDC provided them a briefing on the most recent disaster situation, and information about coordination meetings. 
COORDINATION ON THE WEBSITE "VIRTUAL OSOCC"
Coordination of international search and rescue teams was not only carried out in Nepal, but it began immediately after the occurrence of the earthquake on the Internet. Through the website called "Virtual OSOCC" 5 that OCHA is operating, experts of international disaster assistance can share information about the damage situation and about the mobilization of their teams. In the case of the Nepal earthquake, within two hours after the earthquake, exchange of information on the earthquake has been initiated by the OCHA-FCSS staff in Geneva.
The INSARAG Guidelines request that international search and rescue teams indicate their status (Monitoring, Standby, Deployed, Stand-down, and Mission Completed) on the Virtual OSOCC. Also, when their dispatch is determined, teams are requested to upload the Team Fact Sheet, which is designated by INSARAG on the Virtual OSOCC to share basic information of the team. By doing this, RDC, OSOCC, and the governments of affected countries can know the total number of incoming teams and their basic information before their arrival in country.
When deploying international search and rescue teams, it is necessary to obtain the consent of the affected country government 6 . By sharing information on whether the affected country intends to accept international assistance, the Virtual OSOCC enables the affected governments to mitigate burdens such as the numerous inquiries about request of international assistance.
When Mr. Okita checked the website on 28 April, three days after the earthquake, he saw that an OCHA staff who confirmed the intention of the Nepalese government wrote that "Search and rescue teams that do not leave the country at this stage should stand down." This information was also referenced in the Situation Report issued by OCHA.
2)
COORDINATION IN THE FIELD
This chapter will examine the coordination of international search and rescue teams carried out in the emergency phase of the Nepal earthquake, in accordance with the newly endorsed INSARAG methodologies. The details of the INSARAG methodologies and the USAR Coordination Cell (UCC), which is a part of the OSOCC, can be found in the INSARAG Guidelines. In brief, the UCC provides the overall picture of search and rescue activities and responsible area of each international team. In addition, by sharing the discussion at the UCC via the Virtual OSOCC, it becomes possible to know the status of the search and rescue activities of the international teams without being in the field. 3) In writing this chapter, we heavily relied on the report written by Mr. David Norlin 4) who served as the chairman of the INSARAG OWG, which contributed to developing the new methodologies, 7 and worked in the UCC in response to the Nepal earthquake.
UCC Operations by the Dutch USAR team
The arrival of the Netherlands's USAR team "USAR NL" in the morning of 27 April triggered the active coordination of the international search and rescue teams in the field. USAR NL received the "Heavy" level classification in the INSARAG External Classification (IEC), which was carried out by INSARAG. The IEC requires not only satisfaction of search and rescue techniques, but the teams seeking classification must show that they can contribute to coordination activities. 8 USAR NL, as one of the first-arriving IEC-classified teams, 9 left one of their staff members to support the RDC operations at the Kathmandu Airport where at that time only one person (Mr. Okita) was running the RDC. The USAR NL team also got permission to use the military land behind the airport for the Base of Operations (BoO) for the international search and rescue teams after consultations with the government and the Nepalese army, who have played a central role in the search and rescue activities. Then, USAR NL started to set up the UCC, which is part of the OSOCC, in the same BoO site (Photo 3).
USAR NL and one of the UNDAC team members started coordination activities in the UCC on the next day, 28 May. On 29 May, additional UNDAC members and support staff from the United States (US), the UK, Japan, etc. and from the UK-based NGO MapAction, which provides mapping support, joined the UCC. In the initial stage, USAR NL led the coordination activities of the international search and rescue teams, and then the UNDAC members took over this responsibility. The UCC had coordination meetings twice a day in the morning and evening, and discussed and coordinated the assignment of the team location, overall strategy of USAR activities, and policy for demobilization, and so on.
Sectorisation
Based on the INSARAG Guidelines, the UCC divided Kathmandu city into several regions, or "Sector", and decided which team is in charge of each sector (Sectorisation) (Figure 1 ). Where the affected country already conducts sectorisation, international team can use the same sectorisation. However, in the case of the Nepal earthquake, sectorisation has not been implemented by the Nepalese government. As such, the UCC did sectorisation based on the one originally done by the US search and rescue team for its own activities. The IEC-classified teams are, in principle, assigned as "Sector Coordinator (SC)" in each sector, and they were in charge of coordinating the teams assigned to that sector. The international teams Photo 3 Coordination meeting for the international search and rescue teams in the early stage of the UCC. The team leader of USAR NL (front) took the lead. You can find the IEC certification badge on his left shoulder.
initially tried to identify the site that needed search and rescue activity, or "worksite", 10 of the ASR (Assessment, Search and Rescue) -2 level (See Table 1 ). However, since it was difficult to identify the worksite, which had the possibility of live rescue in Kathmandu city, the teams soon shifted to the ASR-5 level activity, including the body recovery. This article does not intend to go into the details of the activities in each level (ASR 1-5). However, a brief example will be provided to illustrate the different activities conducted for each level. In the ASR-2 activity, even if teams discover a dead body, the team will not take too much time to extricate the dead body because the focus of activity at that time is to rescue survivors. On the other hand, when conducting the ASR-5 activity, the team should recover a body when they discover it. The UCC tries to coordinate the activities of the international search and rescue teams after confirming the policy of the affected country government.
OCHA, as shown in Table 2 below, summarised the number of activities by the international search and rescue teams deployed to Nepal. Of the 76 international search and rescue teams deployed to the Nepal earthquake, 55 teams participated in the coordination activity by the UCC, and carried out their activities in 19 sectors. It can be easily imagined from these numbers that there will be confusion if there is no coordination. Although, in the Nepal earthquake, 16 survivors were rescued by international teams, 11 of these survivors were rescued by the neighbouring Indian team who could enter Nepal quickly because of its proximity. Table 3 below shows information about the 5 rescued survivors. As can be seen in the Figure 1 , the international search and rescue team applied the sectorisation technique only in Kathmandu city. There were several reasons for this, and the biggest reason was that there were more and more buildings made of brick as they were away from urban areas. Table 3 shows that the 5 survivors rescued by the international teams were not in buildings made of bricks which are typical in Nepal (Photo 4), but from tall buildings made of reinforced concrete (Photo 5). Reinforced concrete building, when it collapses, has the possibility of leaving the space necessary for survival. Local residents or teams who do not have the proper equipment to break concrete cannot rescue the survivors trapped inside. However, international teams can contribute to saving these trapped people with their 10 Worksite is defined by the INSARAG Guidelines as "any site where significant USAR operations are carried out". techniques and equipment, although it takes them time to reach the disaster-affected country. This is the reason why the international teams' focus is "urban" search and rescue instead of the general search and rescue activity. 6) 
Team ID
The INSARAG Guidelines request each team to use a unique team ID, combining the Olympics code and two-digit number. This is done for the purpose of avoiding confusion in the marking and assessment forms. The IEC-classified teams should use the three-digit alphabet of the Olympic code and a number starting from 01. Taking Japan as an example, the JDR rescue team that is already classified in IEC uses "JPN-01" while other non-classified teams use the number after 10. In the Nepal earthquake, for example, Japan Rescue Association was assigned "JPN-10" upon arrival, and "JPN-11" was given to Peace Winds Japan.
14 In the Nepal earthquake response, the team ID was used effectively with minimal confusion.
Marking
In line with the revision of the INSARAG Guidelines, significant revisions were performed for the INSARAG marking system. Marking here refers to the sign that international search and rescue teams leave on the buildings, in which they conduct search and rescue activities, about the status of search and rescue activities (e.g. existence of survivors, location of victims) in order to avoid duplication of 13 Created by the author based on individual interview from each team, and on information of media. For example, cases of survivors 4 and 5 are based on the following news article: The Guardian "Nepal earthquake: two rescued after five days in Kathmandu building wreckage" (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/30/hopes-of-finding-earthquake-survivors-fade-nature-seems-to-be -against-us) and Sugam Pokharel, CNN "Woman rescued from damaged hotel five days after Nepal earthquake" (http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/30/asia/nepal-earthquake-womanrescued/) (Both accessed on 29 May 2015). 14 For examples of other countries, Australia has two teams received the IEC certification. It is determined in advance that the Queensland team uses AUS-01 while the New South Wales team is AUS-02. Similarly, the Fairfax team in the US is USA-01, while the Los Angeles team is USA-02. activities with the subsequent teams. INSARAG established the "old" marking system around the year 2000, and it was revised and endorsed by the ISG in 2015. 3) In response to the Nepal earthquake, the INSARAG Secretariat requested teams to use the revised marking system. However, there were reports that some teams mistakenly combined the old marking with the new marking. For example, Photo 6 is the marking conducted by the Singaporean USAR team, but it combined the structural marking (top), which should be done for each building, the victim marking (left bottom), which is for each victim, and the rapid clearance marking, which shows that there is no more need for search and rescue activities (right bottom). These markings should be used separately. INSARAG has been working on the familiarization of the revised marking system through training exercises, 3) but the Nepal earthquake shows that INSARAG needs to provide more opportunities for training on it in future.
Forms
INSARAG has designated 5 standard forms, shown in Table 4 , that each team should use in the field.
3) However, the most used form in the Nepal earthquake was a simple report that summarised the main points of each sector rather than these standard forms. One of the biggest reasons why the INSARAG standard forms were not used a lot was the small numbers of worksites and victims who needed to be rescued. Thus it was more convenient for the teams to use simpler reports of each sector instead of sharing detailed information on each collapsed building and each victim. It is, of course, recommended for the designated forms to be used, but based on the type and scale of disaster, it can be said that flexibility is required to some extent so that the teams can coordinate in the most efficient manner.
15 According to the survey by Mr. David Norlin, as of 4 May, the number of hard copies at the UCC were: 6 Team Fact Sheets, 9 Worksite Triage Forms, 10 Worksite Report Forms, 3 Victim Extrication Forms, and 17 Demobilization Forms. The number of reports that summarised the main points of the sector was 29. 16 Created by the author based on the INSARAG Guidelines.
Photo 6 The marking (top) indicates that the Singapore team carried out ASR-5 activity on 30 April at the unstable building. The team recovered one body (left bottom), and no more need for search and rescue activity at this building (right bottom). These markings should not be used in combination.
FOR THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL USAR: "RESCUE PHASE", "COORDINATION" AND "DISASTER LITERACY"
In this chapter, through the authors' experiences in the field and the previous discussions in this paper, the authors will propose the following matters as what experts of international search and rescue should keep in their minds in their work. These are:
(1) Declaration of the end of the "Rescue Phase", which tends to be misunderstood in Japan; (2) Contribution to "Coordination" and role of developed countries; and (3) What we call "Disaster Literacy", or the basic knowledge that experts in this field should have
This chapter is expected to form the first step of future discussion, and it is not asserted that the contents below are necessarily correct.
Declaration of the end of "Rescue Phase"
As mentioned in Chapter 3, on 28 April 2015, or three days after the earthquake, the Nepalese government had requested the international community to stop sending international search and rescue teams that has not left their home country by that point. This information was shared through the Virtual OSOCC and the Situations Report issued by OCHA. Table 5 shows the number of the international search and rescue teams that arrived each day and registered at the RDC. The number of the arrival of international search and rescue teams has decreased after the stand-down request on 28 April, and it can be said that the stand-down request by the affected government had an impact to some extent on the decision to dispatch the team. For example, the staff of the New Zealand search and rescue team, an IEC-classified team, called Mr. Okita at the RDC in order to confirm the stand-down message posted on the Virtual OSOCC. Although many other issues also affected its decision, New Zealand ultimately decided not to deploy its team. Regarding the international search and rescue teams that already entered the country, the Nepalese government had, in consultation with OCHA, issued a letter (Figure 2 ) on 3 May, or 8 days after the earthquake. In this letter, the government declared the "end of the international USAR phase" and asked international teams to start preparation for departure. The government also requested for the teams that would stay in Nepal to assist in the recovery of dead bodies. 7) Between the stand-down request on 28 April and the end of international USAR phase on 3 May, the Nepalese government has also suggested ending the rescue phase and thus transition to the "Recovery" phase on 30 April, or 5 days after the earthquake. Some argued that the shift to "Recovery" phase was too early considering that some live rescues were conducted on 30 April. 8) It is necessary to emphasise here that the transition to recovery phase does not mean the end of the rescue operation. As it can be seen in the letter, the Nepalese government did not end the rescue activities, nor given up on live rescue possibilities. Rather, the government would mobilise additional rescue resources of Nepal and continue the rescue work. Moreover, the word "recovery" is misleading, especially for Japan. Words such as "restoration" or "recovery" tend to be linked to long-term support, but in this context, it should be understood as a shift from "Rescue (of survivors)" to "Recovery (of dead bodies)". 9) In consideration of the feelings of the victims and their families, it is always a difficult decision for the affected government to end the rescue phase since it could be seen as the government giving up on rescuing survivors. On the other hand, especially when dealing with international assistance, it is necessary for the affected government to clearly indicate the priority of the current activity. The shift to "Recovery phase" was done 11 days after the earthquake in the Haiti earthquake in 2010, and 9 days after the earthquake in the New Zealand earthquake in 2011. 9) Unless timely done, there is a risk that unnecessary search and rescue teams continue to enter the affected country. It may interfere with the entry of the resources such as food, shelter and medical assistance, which are more necessary. The authors working at the RDC negotiated frequently with the airport authority as there were a lot of requests from the international teams for landing permission. As of 28 April, the priority of the Nepalese government on giving landing permission was very clear: (in the order of high priority) (1) medical team and equipment, (2) food, (3) shelter (tents) and (4) rescue teams. It is necessary for the person in charge of disaster management to clarify the priority of response and share it with the international community. The shift to "Recovery phase" should not be postponed on the basis of the feelings of the victims, particularly if it becomes an obstacle for providing support to the victims who are alive.
Contribution to "Coordination" and the role of developed countries
As noted in this paper, USAR NL played a very important role to the coordination of the international search and rescue teams. Other than the Netherlands, there were other international search and rescue teams who also provided support personnel to the RDC and the UCC. These teams not only focused on their own activities but contributed to the coordination of international USAR teams. In contrast, it is worth noting that there was one team who arrived at Kathmandu Airport on 29 April, after the Nepalese government had requested the cessation of incoming international search and rescue teams and had, instead, requested for the "Recovery phase" to begin. This team had insisted to be taken immediately to the site with possibility of live rescue. This team ignored the requests of the Nepalese government and focused on their own activity only. This team's activities were counter-productive and inhibited the overall coordination by the Nepalese government.
As some of the teams stood not only in the "side to be coordinated", but in the "side to coordinate", it should not be forgotten that the ownership, or the main actor, of coordination lies in the person being coordinated. How can the teams contribute in the overall disaster response? By not only focusing on its own activity, but support the affected country through active contribution to the coordination activity.
The media reports that the assistance did not reach the affected region triggered additional international assistance sent from many countries. However, the authors witnessed that the Kathmandu Airport had difficulty processing the incoming cargos because it had surpassed its original acceptance capacity. The author received a question from media asking if the staff of the Kathmandu Airport was "blocking" the process of handling of relief goods. The authors can advise that the airport staff worked around the clock after the occurrence of the earthquake, and the incoming cargos were not "blocked" intentionally.
It is easy to criticise the difficult situation of cargo handling at the airport. However, as outside supporters, we must be supportive of the affected country in the area where they have difficulty, instead of just criticizing it. Instead of confusing the affected country by sending additional relief goods and personnel, international assistance can contribute to the field of logistics such as transportation assistance. For example, DHL Corporation had provided support staff for cargo handling at the airport at no charge (Photo 7), and some donors had provided forklifts for cargo handling (Photo 8). As the Netherlands have played an important role in the coordination of international search and rescue teams in response to the Nepal earthquake, the authors argue that the developed countries have a responsibility to not only focus on their own activities, but to also contribute to other activities such as coordination and logistics, and looking at providing support from a wholistic perspective. The financial advantages of developed countries means that they can not only increase the amount of relief goods and personnel "quantitatively", but can also deepen the assistance "qualitatively."
"Disaster Literacy"
Finally, in relation to the above two points, the authors argue that the person who is in charge of international USAR activity should meet the minimum "Disaster Literacy", or the ability to anticipate the results that are caused by the disaster. As shown by the example of the Nepal earthquake and past disasters, questions such as the types of assistance needed and the possible obstacles, can be, to some extent, answered based on the certain factors.
To illustrate the application of disaster literacy, in the Nepal earthquake, there were many buildings built of brick in Nepal, and they did not leave the space necessary for survival when they collapsed. It could be surmised that this decreased the possibility of survival for anyone trapped inside, and thus decreased the possibility of live rescues by the international search and rescue teams. This can be judged, to some extent, from the location of the epicenter, the scale of the earthquake, the popular building structure in that region and so on even without going to the site.
In the Great East Japan earthquake (and tsunami) in 2011, 92% of the cause of death was drowning.
18 Most of the victims were swept away by the tsunami and thus it was different from the damage caused by the building collapses in earthquakes. Because of this, the 20 international teams with 890 personnel could not save any live victim. 9) In case of the Haiti earthquake in 2010, 132 people were rescued by the 52 international search and rescue teams with 1,820 personnel. The Haiti case was the type of disaster that international search and rescue teams could contribute to live rescues, considering the building structure and other conditions. 9) Disaster literacy can contribute to the decision-making on whether to deploy international search and rescue teams. It must be pointed out here that, even in the Haiti earthquake where 132 people were rescued, there were opinions such as "Did we really need international search and rescue teams?" when considering its cost effectiveness. 10) In the article "My thoughts on International Urban Search and Rescue", 6) the author (Mr. Okita) pointed out the possible positive effects of international search and rescue teams even if they cannot save live victims (e.g. solidarity with affected people, improvement in diplomatic relationship). However, it should be recognised that the deployment of an international search and rescue team will incur a huge financial cost. Therefore, it may also be necessary to make a decision of not sending international search and rescue teams, depending on the situation. In some cases, other forms of assistance, such as sending medical teams, food aid and financial assistance should be considered. In addition, deploying search and rescue teams with only light, mobile equipment and focusing on body recovery in mountainous areas can be a possible option.
In the example of the Nepal earthquake, given the strength of the earthquake, the types of buildings in the disaster zone (being mostly brick buildings), the international search and rescue teams that arrived on or after 29 April, the day of stand-down message, should prepare equipment for, not only live rescue, but body recovery such as protective clothing. Unfortunately, many teams were not well prepared for it. 8) If we stand at the original position that international assistance should support the affected countries, these ill-prepared teams cannot complain even if their entry is declined after 29 April.
In addition, another important component of disaster literacy is understanding of the affected country's context. Shortly after the earthquake, the chief of OCHA-FCSS, through the Virtual OSOCC, requested the international teams to be mobile (easy to move) with only light equipment to cater for the Kathmandu airport's limited acceptance capacity and the difficult domestic transportation. The access to the mountainous area, where it was difficult to access even in peacetime and was severely damaged by the earthquake, was a major obstacle for international search and rescue activities 11) . In fact, a few days after the earthquake, an airplane which exceeded 96 tons had been prohibited to land because of limitations in the airport's capacity. Although some countries use large transport aircraft for deployment of international search and rescue teams, they are not always a good option to take, and thus they must be flexible based on the situation of the affected country. In this case, disaster literacy would suggest that using commercial flights might be a better option.
(The opinion shown in this paper is a personal view of the authors, and it is not intended to represent the opinion of the organizations that we belong to.)
